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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
vendee is afforded relief, while the vendor is placed in much the
same position as if he were suing on his implied lin." A sound
decision has been reached in this litigation, achieving a result
that challenges current theory as to the decadence of equity.'
-ROBERT W. BuRm

T.Ax&TION -

CONsT

moUNoAL LAW -

DUE PRocESs op LAW
DMECT PROPERTY TAXES. The town of Carolina Beach, having defaulted in payment of
principal and interest of bonds issued for certain public improvements, the holder thereof obtained judgment and afterwards a writ of mandamus requiring the town to levy a tax upon
real and personal property sufficient to pay the total amount of
the bonds and the costs of the suit. Plaintiff, a hotel company,
sues to restrain the collection of the tax "on the ground that such
tax is exorbitant and confiscatory."
The writ of mandamus
necessitated an increase in the tax levy from one dollar to three
dollars, per hundred, over a period of three years.
Held: The
judgment against the town was binding on the inhabitants:
dictum, that plaintiff was not deprived of its property without due
process of law. Pate Hotel Company v. Morris.'
As to procedural objections, it is the recognized rule that
a judgment or decree against a municipality imposes an obligation upon its citizens which they are compelled to discharge, exAS PRESCRIBING MAxIrUM LIMITS FOR

pointed time. And, that the chancellor treats the contract as executed in fact
though it is executory in form.
"Fisher v. Brown, 24 W. Va. 713 (1884); King v. Burdett et al., 44 W.
Va. 561, 29 S. E. 1010 (1898). It is said in MeNeely v. S. P. Oil Co. et al.,
52 W. Va. 616, 44 S. E. 508 (1902) the vendors only remedy against vendee
would be to specifically execute the contract, have balance due decreed, and in
default of payment after a day given therefore, a decree to sell and have
vendee's equity foreclosed. In Liskey v. Snyder, supra n. 15, at 528,
it is said that vendor has option to cause the lands to be sold and the
proceeds thus disposed of, or to rescind the contract for failure of the vendee
to comply with his part. But, even so, the former of these would be his best
remedy, for equity would relieve from a forfeiture of vendee's payments in
case of a rescission.
The implied lien, where vendor retains the title, is not affected by the
statute abolishing implied liens in conveyances. See reviser's note to c. 38,
art. 1, § 1, W. VA. CoDE (1931). Poe v. Paxton, 26 W. Va. 607, 610 (1885).
mPound, The Decadence of Equity (1905) 5 COL. L. REv. 20.
1171 S. E. 799 (N. C. 1933).
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cept where mistake or fraud can be shown; nor can they sue to
prevent the enforcement of a levy providing for payment.'
Likewise, there are multitudes of decisions enunciating the
principle that a state, in the absence of express constitutional
limitations, determines its own policy in matters of taxation, and
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is not
a restriction upon the taxing power of a state nor local governmental subdivision.' There are, however, certain instances where
various tax measures have failed to withstand the application of
the due process clause. Foremost among these are the license
cases holding that such a tax must not be imposed so as arbitrarily
to prohibit or suppress legitimate business activity.' Occupation
2

Morton Motor Co. v. Public Service Commission, 111 W. Va. 22, 160 S.
E. 226 (1931); 1 FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS (5th ed. TUTTLE 1925) § 507
and cases cited. See Eames v. Savage, 77 Me. 212 (1885), holding that a
statute permitting execution, following judgment against towns or cities, to
be levied upon the property of the inhabitants, did not violate the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
8
In Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 563 (1830) Marshall, C. J.,
declared: "This vital power (taxation) may be abused; but the constitution
of the United States was not intended to furnish the corrective of every
abuse of power which may be committed by the state governments. The
interest, wisdom, and justice of the representive body, and its relations
with its constituents, furnish the only security, where there is no express contract, against unjust and excessive taxation; .... " And many years later
in Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R., 240 U. S. 1, 24, 36 S. Ct. 236, 244 (1915),
the court said: "So far as the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
is relied upon, it suffices to say that there is no basis for such reliance since
it is equally well settled that such clause is not a limitation upon the taxing
power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution; in other words, that the
Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring upon the one hand
a taxing power and taking the same power away on the other by the limitation of the due process clause."

And further, it was added,-". .

.

. this

doctrine would have no application in a case where although there was a
seeming exercise of the taxing power, the act complained of was so arbitrary
as to constrain to the conclusion that it was not the exertion of taxation but
a confiscation of property, that is, a taking of the same in violation of the
Fifth Amendment, ....
" In State v. Page, 100 W. Va. 166, 169, 130 S.
E. 426, 427 (1925), the court stated: "When not limited by the constitution, the power of the state, acting through its governmental agencies, to
tax its citizens, is absolute and unlimited as to persons and property." And,
in same opinion, it was held, "The state exists for the purpose of securing
the life, liberty and property of its citizens, and may, within the limits
prescribed by the constitution, exhaust all the resources of private property in
support and preservation of that existence." See 1 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th
ed. 1924) §§ 57 and 162.
But compare Marshall's famous statement in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 14 L. ed. 316 (1819), that "the power to tax is the power to
destroy", with the words of Holmes, J., in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi,
277 U. S. 218, 223, 48 S. Ct. 451 (1928), "The power to tax is not the
power to destroy while this court sits." (Italics ours), (dissent).
'It is important to note that license taxes (actually fees) imposed under
the police power for the purpose of regulating businesses and trades are
distinguished from license taxes for revenue only. Courts do not permit the
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taxes, confiscatory in nature and effect, have been held invalid.'
The same has been true of a few excise and privilege taxes, when
they reached the point of destroying private property rights.'
And, in a recent case, a multiple chain store tax scheme was held
invalid upon the ground of the excessiveness of the tax as it afBut, apparently, no court has said that a
fected the appellants
direct property tax violated the due process clause. Is there a
distinction between direct and indirect taxation of property? The
direct tax must be uniform within the taxing unit or governmental
division. It may be retroactive. People are accustomed to direct
assessments. The indirect tax must possess uniformity, only in
that the things taxed must be treated equally. Generally, it can
regulatory fees to exceed the reasonable amount necessary for administration. In re Wan Yin, 22 Fed. 701 (1885) (holding a quarterly laundry fee
of $5 or $20 for the full year as void under the due process clause). Herb
Bros. v. City of Alton, 264 Ill. 628, 106 N. B. 434 (1914) (a license fee of
$100 a year imposed on all vendors of meats was held invalid). The court
while a license fee may be exacted it must be only such a fee
said: I ....
as will legitimately assist in the regulation of the business and should not
exceed the necessary or probable expense of issuing the license and of inspecting and regulating the business which it covers ..... "
But a wider discretion is accorded the legislature in the imposition of a
license tax for revenue. Ez parte McKenna, 126 Cal. 429, 58 Pac. 916 (1899)
(a license tax of $200 per quarter on all merchants using trading stamps
was declared invalid as in restraint of trade). But see Sperry and Hutchinson v. Melton, 69 W. Va. 124, 71 S. B. 19 (1911) (a legislative act requiring
a tax of $500 a year on merchants selling or redeeming trading stamps was
held valid). As to trading stamp taxation in general see Note (1931) 40
CoL. L. Ruv. 1112.
sHager v. Walker, 128 Ky. 1, 107 S. W. 254 (1908) (while holding the
tax invalid, the court said that the legislature did not possess unlimited freedom from judicial control in imposing taxes upon trades, occupations and
professions).
OSalisbury v. Equitable Purchasing Co., 177 Ky. 348, 197 S. W. 813
(1917) (a tax equalling 33 per cent. of net income held invalid); Williams
v. Waynesboro, 152 Ga. 696, 111 S. E. 47 (1922) (a tax equalling 12 per
cent. of net income held invalid); Southern Express Co. v. Town of Ty Ty,
141 Ga. 421, 81 S. E. 114 (1914) (a tax equalling 16 per cent. of gross
income held invalid). However, it is generally held that the amount of a
privilege or excise tax is a matter of legislative policy outside the control
of the courts. Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576, 34 S. Ct. 372 (1914) (even
though the railroads could not meet operating expenses); Brushaber v. Union
Pac. R. R., supra n. 3; Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642,
41 S. Ct. 606 (1921) (a gasoline tax); Railroad Company v. Maryland, 21
Wall. 456, 471 (1874) where the court said: "It (the legislature) has a right
to exact compensation for their use. It has a discretion as to the amount of
that compensation. That discretion is legislative - a sovereign - discretion,
and in its very nature is unrestricted and uncontrolled."
It is recognized that a franchise tax must be measured by the value of the
privilege for which it is imposed. See Air-Way Appliance Co. v. Day, 266
U. S. 71, 45 S. Ct. 12 (1924); Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Road Imp. Dist.,
256 U. S. 658, 41 S. Ct. 604 (1921).
a deciF. (2d) -,
Standard Oil Co. v. Fox, Tax Commissioner, sion by a three-judge statutory court, holding invalid the West Virginia
chain store tax, as applied to filling stations (decided March, 1934).
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not be retroactive, because time must be allowed so that it may
be figured in with the business.' The public, except for those
excises imposed by the federal government, are not accustomed to
indirect taxation. The problems of direct taxation have primarily
concerned the disparity in different tax standards' and equality
in assessments, ° - a condition practically impossible to attain'
In recent years, however, as a partial result of the rapid increase of property assessments and rates, coupled with the decreasing return from the capital invested, the country has witnessed a successful movement expressly to limit by statutory and
constitutional provisions the tax rate on land and chattels 2 The
8 But there are a few cases holding that an indirect tax may be retroactive.
Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15, 51 S. Ct. 324 (1931); Billings v.
United States, 232 U. S. 261, 34 S. Ct. 421 (1914).
0Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Fairweather, 26a U. S. 103, 44 S. Ct. 23 (1923).
See (1923) 9 IowA L. BuLL. 219.
"Equality as to assessments concerns chiefly the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County,
Nebraska, 260 U. S. 441, 43 S. Ct. 190 (1922); Southern By. Co. v. Watts,
260 U. S. 519, 43 S. Ct. 192 (1923); Henderson Bridge Co. v. City of Henderson, 173 U. S. 592, 19 S. Ct. 553 (1899).
"In the early case of Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171, 179 (1796),
Patterson, J., said: "The work, (referring to a direct property tax system)
it is to be feared, will be operose and unproductive, and full of inequality,
injustice, and oppression. Let us, however, hope, that a system of land
taxation may be so corrected and matured by practice, as to become easy
and equal in its operation, and productive and beneficial in its effects."
Conditions to-day show that time and actual practice have not fulfilled the
hope.
2The tax limitations which have been adopted present an amazing variety.
Some states limit the rate which may be levied; a few limit the per capita
amount which may be raised; and a few have fixed the gross amount of
money. which general property owners must contribute for governmental
expenses. For present purposes, we shall refer to state-wide blanket-limits
on the rate of property taxes; and the states which have recently adopted
such provisions are: Indiana, (stat.) 1932; Michigan, (const.) 1932; Now
Mexico, (const.) 1933; North Dakbta; Ohio, (const.) 1931 and rate reduced
still lower in 1933; Oklahoma, (const.) 1933; Washington, (stat.) 1932;
West Virginia, (const.) 1932; and the Iowa legislature has enacted a statute
which in effect reduced millage rates twenty per cent. Kansas voted down a
proposed constitutional amendment in 1932, but a statute setting up certain
limitations was adopted by the legislature in 1933.
In practically every state there are certain limitations setting maxima for
the respective rates of the state, municipalities and local taxing units. For
a general discussion see LEET & PAGE, PROPERTY TAX LIMITATION LAWS
(1934). (The evidence and the arguments for and against them by twentyfour authorities).
The effect of the tax limitation amendment in West Virginia has been the
loss of twenty million dollars in property taxes (exclusive of debt services).
This deprivation of governmental revenue has made it necessary that the
state assume the obligation of providing public schools, (eight months of
the year), and take over all district and county roads: thus causing greater
centralization in the state and a partial destruction of local government.
One of the main purposes behind the amendment was to force government
expenses downward.
This has been true.
But the amendment is not an
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effect of these limitations has been to drive legislative bodies, in
their search for revenue, to various indirect tax devices; and
seemingly, since governmental expenses have not decreased proportionately, the public monies must perforce come largely from
indirect taxes. Whether a legislative limitation can or will be
worked out is doubtful; yet such is possible, provided sufficient
public sentiment be aroused. Apparently, then, there are thus to
be three restrictions upon limits of taxation, whether direct or
indirect: (1) economic limitations, - indirect taxation, if too
great, will drive businesses from the state, while direct taxes will,
to a certain extent, be governed by defaults and delinquencies;
(2) legislative limitations, - always possible in respect of indirect taxes, and now provided for in many states as to direct taxes;
and finally, (3) judicial limitations, - already recognized in the
field of indirect taxation: the principal case is seemingly one of
the first to attempt to apply the contention to a direct tax. One
may confidently anticipate more such attempts in the future.
-CARLEs

TAXATION

-

WARRANTS

DRAWN

ON

W. CALDWELL.

OvERDRAWN

COUNTY

FUNDs AS LEGAL TENDER FOR THE PAYMENT OF TAXEs. -

The

plaintiff, claiming under the statute making county orders legal
tender for the payment of taxes,' applied to the Supreme
Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel
the defendant, as sheriff, to receive certain county orders, payable out of the then overdrawn general county fund, in full discharge of the plaintiff's taxes. In deciding the case, the court
held that the statute was to be construed together with a more
recent statute providing that funds raised by taxes shall be expended only for the purposes for which levied,' and that the
absolute safeguard in cutting off governmental expenditures, inasmuch as
several indirect tax devices have been substituted. It is suggested, however,
that as a general sales tax touches the pocket-book of the whole public,
there will be a greater public interest, which will demand controlled expenditures.
1W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 7, art. 5, § 10, "Every officer charged with
the collection of taxes and officers' fees shall receive in payment therefor,
at par, any county or school order or draft, drawn on him pursuant to law,
which is then due and payable, if the person offering the same in payment
be the person entitled thereto at the time it is so offered."
2W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 11, art. 8, § 12, "Any funds derived from

levying of taxes under and pursuant to the provisions of this article shall
be expended for the purposes for which levied and no other."
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